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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT EDWARDS & DANIELS ARCHITECTS, INC.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court found that Farmers' Properties agreed that Edwards

& Daniels be retained as project architect for a fee of at least $117,000.00. That
finding satisfied the "consultation" requirement of paragraph 8 of the Lease
Agreement.

1

2.

Edwards & Daniels is entitled to be paid for all of the work that it

did, including the 53 percent that Gregory Soter wanted to avoid paying until
construction financing was obtained.
3.

The trial court did not err in holding that Edwards & Daniels was

an intended beneficiary of the Lease Agreement. No extrinsic evidence was admissible,
since the provision in paragraph 8 was clear and unambiguous.
4.

The trial court properly excluded evidence relating to the alleged

failure of conditions precedent, since defendants had not made proper answers to their
interrogatories.
ARGUMENT
I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT
FARMERS' PROPERTIES' AGREEMENT TO RETAIN EDWARDS &
DANIELS AS PROJECT ARCHITECT SATISFIED THE "CONSULTATION"
REQUIREMENT OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT.
A.

The central issue on appeal is whether the "consultation"
requirement of paragraph 8 was satisfied by Farmers'
Properties' agreement to retain Edwards & Daniels as the
project architect for a fee of at least $117,000.00.
Throughout their brief, the Farmers' Properties defendants demonstrate a

gaping misunderstanding of the issues that were tried below. The primary issue at
trial was whether the "consultation" requirement of paragraph 8 of the Lease
Agreement was satisfied. In spite of the lower court's findings that the Farmers'
Properties defendants met with Edwards & Daniels in Salt Lake City, that they
approved of its being retained as project architect, and that they agreed that Edwards
0W12M43.1
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& Daniels would be paid a fee of between $117,000.00 and $130,500.00 (Findings of
Fact Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28; R. 982-83),] the lower court held that no "consultation"
occurred (Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 12.) According to Finding of Fact No. 26, Farmers'
Properties agreed and knew that Edwards & Daniels would be paid a fee of at least
$117,000.00 (4.5 percent of $2,600,000).
Edwards & Daniels' opening brief clearly describes the basis for this
appeal. Edwards & Daniels is not appealing from the findings that Soter/Knudsen did
not advise Farmers' Properties regarding the architects' fees (Findings of Fact Nos. 7,
8; R. 978-79) or that Edwards & Daniels' invoices were not sent to Farmers' Properties
(Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 979).2 Edwards & Daniels is appealing from the finding

1

The lower court found that, at the second meeting in Salt Lake City in June, 1984,
"the parties discussed the fee that Edwards & Daniels would charge for its architectural
services. It was agreed that Edwards & Daniels would charge a fee equal to 4.5 percent
of the estimated cost of construction, which the parties discussed as being between $2.6
and $2.9 million." (Finding of Fact No. 26; R. 983.) The fee would thus be between
$117,000.00 and $130,500.00. This was consistent with the Agreement between
Edwards & Daniels and Soter/Knudsen Construction Company ("Soter/Knudsen"), which
provided, at Article 14.2.1, that Edwards & Daniels would be paid a fee equal to 4.5
percent of the "Construction Cost as defined under Article 3." (Exhibit 1-P.) Under
Article 3, Edwards & Daniels submitted a Statement of Probable Costs, which showed the
probable cost of the project at $2,988,855.00. (Exhibit 4-P; Tr. [1-31-90], at 61-62.)
Each of Edwards & Daniels' invoices to Soter/Knudsen (Exhibits 5-P through 20-P)
showed the estimated cost of construction as $2.9 million. (Findings of Fact Nos. 32, 33;
R. 983.) Soter/Knudsen did not object to any of the invoices. (Finding of Fact No. 31;
R. 983.)
2

It was on this basis, and this basis alone, that the lower court held against Edwards
& Daniels. The court held that the "consultation" condition of paragraph 8 had not been
met. The court disbelieved Greg Soter, who testified that he consulted with Farmers'
Properties from time to time and that he sent copies of Edwards & Daniels' invoices to
them. (Findings of Fact Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10; R. 978-79.) Edwards & Daniels has not
(continued...)
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that "the meetings in the summer of 1984 were not consultations as contemplated by
paragraph #8 of the September, 1984 lease." (Finding of Fact No. 12; R. 980.)3
The Farmers' Properties defendants completely ignore the finding that
they knew of and agreed to the hiring of Edwards & Daniels as the project architect.
They fail to address the significance of that finding in their brief. They do not explain
why, if they knew and agreed that Edwards & Daniels was going to be the project
architect for a fee of at least $117,000.00, they needed any further consultation under
the terms of paragraph 8. The Farmers' Properties defendants utilize most of the
space in their brief rehashing arguments that they made at trial, focusing on the
testimony that Soter/Knudsen failed to consult or send the architect's invoices.
Nowhere in their brief do they explain what additional information they would have
obtained from a further consultation with Soter/Knudsen regarding the work that
Edwards & Daniels' was doing and the fee to be charged.
B.

The lower court's application of the facts to the provisions
of paragraph 8 was erroneous as a matter of law, being an
application of facts (uncontroverted for the purposes of this
appeal] to the terms of a written document.
As noted above, the lower court specifically found that the Farmers'

Properties defendants agreed that Edwards & Daniels would be retained as the project

2

(...continued)
appealed from these findings.
3

As discussed below, that finding is, in reality, nothing more than a conclusion of law
and should not be accorded any added deference simply because it was denominated as
a finding of fact. State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).
Mtt2M43.1

4

architect and that Edwards & Daniels would charge a fee equal to 4.5 percent of the
estimated cost of construction of between $2.6 and $2.9 million. (Findings of Fact
Nos. 24, 25, 26; R. 982-83). The lower court erred in its application of the facts set
forth in the Findings of Fact to paragraph 8 of the Lease Agreement. The legal
significance of Findings of Fact Nos. 24-45 (R. 982-86) under paragraph 8 involves a
purely legal analysis. This Court need not defer to the trial court's conclusion that the
meetings in the summer of 1984 were not "consultations" as contemplated by
paragraph 8. As a matter of law, this Court can hold that Farmers' Properties was
bound by the notice that they had previously received when they signed the Lease
Agreement on September 14, 1984. The lower court found that, when the Farmers'
Properties defendants signed the Lease Agreement, they "knew that Edwards & Daniels
had been retained as the project architect and that it was going to complete all of the
necessary drawings, plans, and specifications for the construction of the Hotel/Casino
project." (Finding of Fact No. 28; R. 983.)
The lower court's finding that the agreement reached in the summer of
1984 was not a "consultation" within the meaning of the Lease Agreement is not so
much a finding of fact, as a conclusion of law to which this Court should accord no
deference. This Court can apply the facts found by the lower court to the Lease
Agreement as easily as the lower court. In In re Estate of Dodge, 98 Cal. Rptr. 801,
491 P.2d 385 (1971), the court considered the standard of review where the issue
involves the construction of a written instrument. Relying on the rule that it is "a

0W2M431
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judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon
the credibility of extrinsic evidence," 491 P.2d at 389, the court stated:
The possibility that conflicting inferences can be drawn
from uncontroverted evidence does not relieve the
appellate court of its duty independently to interpret the
instrument; it is only when the issue turns upon the
credibility of extrinsic evidence, or requires resolution of a
conflict in that evidence, that the trial court determination
is binding.
Id. In a subsequent case, the same court held that "where the extrinsic evidence is
uncontroverted, but conflicting inferences may be drawn . . . the appellate court must
exercise an independent judgment with respect to the interpretation of a written
instrument, and if it determines that the interpretation of the instrument, as made by
the trial court, is erroneous, it may reverse the judgment." Matter of Estate of
Huntington. 58 Cal. App. 3d 197, 129 Cal. Rptr. 787, 793 (1976).
In the present case, the lower court found that Farmers' Properties
agreed that Edwards & Daniels would be retained as the project architect and that it
would be paid a fee of at least $117,000.00. Those facts are uncontroverted for the
purpose of this appeal. It remains for this Court to apply those uncontroverted facts
to the written Lease Agreement. The lower court erred in holding that the
consultation requirement had not been met under these facts. This Court is in as good
a position to draw inferences from the uncontroverted facts, as they apply to the Lease
Agreement, as the lower court.

0S812M43.1
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C.

The court found that the Farmers' Properties defendants
knew that Edwards & Daniels had been retained as project
architect for a minimum fee of $117,000.00 and had
extensive contact with Edwards & Daniels regarding the
design of the project.
Consistent with their agreement that Edwards & Daniels be retained as

the project architect, the Farmers' Properties defendants thereafter had significant
contacts with Soter/Knudsen and with Edwards & Daniels regarding the design work
being performed by Edwards & Daniels. The lower court made extensive findings
regarding Farmers' Properties' contacts with Edwards & Daniels after Farmers'
Properties agreed that Edwards & Daniels be retained as project architect.
The court found that Farmers' Properties had extensive involvement in
the project, including ongoing communications with Edwards & Daniels regarding its
architectural work. (Findings of Fact Nos. 27-29, 34-45; R. 983-86.) From these
findings of fact, it is clear that Farmers' Properties knew exactly what Edwards &
Daniels was doing and how much it was going to cost. The Farmers' Properties
defendants were hardly innocent and unknowledgeable bystanders to the project, but
were intimately involved.4 (Findings of Fact Nos. 27, 34-45.) Most significantly,

4

In their brief, the Farmers' Properties defendants quote Verl Sorter's testimony that
Greg Soter told him "very emphatically not to have any contact with the architects
whatsoever." (Farmers' Properties' Brief, at 30, quoting Tr. [2-2-90], at 72.) In
attempting to downplay their substantial involvement in the project, the Farmers'
Properties defendants ignore the court's findings that Edwards & Daniels sent them copies
of all plans and had ongoing communications with Farmer's Properties relating to the
design of the project. Farmers' Properties also disregards the evidence that it made
suggested many design changes to Edwards & Daniels and that it coordinated the design
of the kitchen. (Findings of Fact Nos. 36, 37, 38, 40-45; R. 984-86.) Seen in light of
(continued...)
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from the very beginning, Farmers' Properties knew that Edwards & Daniels' fee would
be at least $117,000.00. (Finding of Fact No. 26; R. 982-83.) In their brief, the
Farmers' Properties defendants entirely ignore this important Finding of Fact. They
attempt to side-step the considerable knowledge that they were found to have had
regarding the work of Edwards & Daniels. They fail to discuss the legal significance of
their having approved Edwards & Daniels as the project architect for a fee of at least
$117,000.00. Farmers' Properties completely neglects to explain why, if they knew
and agreed that Edwards & Daniels was to act as project architect and to prepare a
complete set of architectural plans and drawings, they should not be responsible for
paying those fees under paragraph 8 of the Lease Agreement.
In their brief, Farmers' Properties argue that paragraph 8 of the Lease
Agreement required "advance meaningful consultations" (Farmers' Properties' Brief, at
24-25), but they fail to explain why their agreement to hire Edwards & Daniels to
perform all the design work for the entire project for a fee of at least $117,000.00 did
not constitute an "advance meaningful consultation." What more did they want to
know after Edwards & Daniels had been retained? The record and their brief are
silent on that crucial question.
Instead of addressing these important issues, the Farmers' Properties
defendants devote their brief to a discussion of the expectations of the parties that the

4

(...continued)
these findings, Verl Sorter's statement that he never contacted Edwards & Daniels, relied
on by defendants in their Brief, at 30, is disingenuous at best.
088128443.1
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architects fees would be paid through construction financing.5 The Farmers'
Properties defendants document at length in their brief the fact that they and
Soter/Knudsen expected that Edwards & Daniels would be paid through construction
financing. Even Edwards & Daniels expected it, as Ralph Edwards testified.6
Consequently, in their brief, the Farmers' Properties defendants assert that they
believed that all debts, including the architect's fee, would be paid through a
construction loan that Soter/Knudsen expected to obtain.7 The Farmers' Properties
defendants even go so far in their brief as to concede that they failed to contact
Edwards & Daniels regarding its fees simply because they believed that the anticipated
construction loan would take care of the debt. (Farmers' Properties' Brief, at 29-30;
emphasis added.)

5

To be sure, as Edwards & Daniels observed in its opening brief, all of the parties
expected that construction financing would be obtained. (Edwards & Daniels Brief, at 32
n.23.)
6

Ralph Edwards testified that Soter/Knudsen had indicated that it had a "source of
funding" and that all Edwards & Daniels had to do was to "get the documents ready and
the funding would be available." (Tr. [1-31-90], at 118.) Edwards emphasized that
Edwards & Daniels "didn't agree to this, it just seemed logical that it was going to end up
coming out of the construction money." (Tr. [1-31-90], at 119.)
7

In their brief, Farmers' Properties declare that Soter/Knudsen "repeatedly assured"
them that financing would be available and that it would be "almost automatic."
(Farmers' Properties' Brief, at 21.) Both Soter/Knudsen and Edwards & Daniels
"expected" that Edwards & Daniels fees "would be paid from the eventual construction
financing to be obtained from an institutional lender." Id. at 29. "Soter/Knudsen
expected to pay E&D from the construction financing rather than consult with Farmers
Properties on those fees." Id. at 31. "Financing for construction was not to come from
Farmers Properties, but was to come from an institutional lender. Id.
088123443.1
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Thus Farmers' Properties candidly admits that, because construction
financing was expected, they saw no need to inquire of the architects regarding its
fees-even though Farmers' Properties knew that Edwards & Daniels was performing
all of the necessary work to create a final set of plans and even though they knew that
Edwards & Daniels was to be paid at least $117,000.00 for its services. Farmers'
Properties' overconfidence that financing would be obtained explains Verl Sorter's
answers to questions put to him by the court during the trial in which he admitted
that he did not give any thought to the fact that Edwards & Daniels was incurring
additional fees, because he believed they would be paid from construction financing.
(Tr. [2-8-90], at 144.)8 Fran Archuleta conceded at trial that Farmers' Properties
knew "there was some possibility that the $50,000 could be exceeded if we were
consulted, if we agreed." (Tr. [2-9-90], at 21.)
Farmers' Properties' confidence that financing would be obtained explains
why they never troubled to determine the exact amount of fees that Edwards &
Daniels had incurred. It was not until after Edwards & Daniels had sent Farmers'
Properties a final set of architectural plans that Verl Sorter became concerned with the
fees that had been incurred. The trial court found that, after Farmers' Properties
received the final set of plans from Edwards & Daniels, Soter/Knudsen requested that
Farmers' Properties pay a plan-check fee to the City of Winnemucca so that the plans

8

Sherwin Knudsen gave a similar answer when asked what he intended "if no
construction financing was ever obtained, or if construction never occurred." He testified,
"I never thought of that." (Tr. [2-1-90], at 185.)
0*«2M431
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could be reviewed and approved by the city. Farmers' Properties refused to do so and
"gave notice to Gregory Soter, or Soter/Knudsen Construction Company, that Farmers'
Properties was not going to pay any more money for the project." (Finding of Fact
No. 39; R. 984.)9
The fact that none of the Farmers' Properties defendants expected the
construction financing to fall through does not render the provisions of paragraph 8 of
the Lease Agreement unenforceable. Even though the individuals did not expect their
financing to fall through, the Lease Agreement provided for that contingency.
Paragraph 8 describes the rights and duties of the parties "[i]n the event the Lessor
fails to obtain a commitment for financing." (Exhibit 3-P, *[ 8.) In that event,
according to paragraph 8, and in the event that the amount of preliminary expenses
exceed the amount of $50,000.00, "Lessee [Farmers' Properties] shall pay said
additional preliminary expenses at the time Lessor [Soter/Knudsen] gives written
notice to lessee that said financing is not obtainable." Id.
Under this provision, Farmers' Properties is liable to Edwards & Daniels
for the full unpaid fee due and owing. Farmers' Properties agreed to Edwards &
Daniels' retention and agreed that it would be paid a fee of at least $117,000.00.

9

Verl Sorter testified that, when he gave the notice to Greg Soter, he told him, "that
we were not spending any more money on that project until the financing was in place."
(Tr. [2-2-90], at 62.) It was not until this late date that it finally dawned on Farmers'
Properties that their long-awaited financing might not come through. Their belated
notice was not soon enough to stop Edwards & Daniels from performing all of its work,
however. According to Finding of Fact No. 39 (R. 984), Edwards & Daniels had
completed the final set of architectural plans and had sent them to Verl Sorter prior to
his communication to Greg Soter.
08*1284431
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Edwards & Daniels is entitled to judgment against the Farmers' Properties defendants
as a third-party beneficiary to the Lease Agreement.
D.

The ''consultation" requirement was satisfied even though
the meetings in Salt Lake City occurred before the Lease
Agreement was signed.
The fact that Farmers' Properties agreed to the retention of Edwards &

Daniels before the Lease Agreement was executed does not invalidate the effectiveness
of the decision that Edwards & Daniels be retained as the project architect. When
Farmers' Properties signed the lease, they knew and agreed that Edwards & Daniels
had been retained for a fee of at least $117,000.00. They knew that "Edwards &
Daniels had been retained as the project architect and that it was going to complete
all of the necessary drawings, plans, and specifications for the construction of the
Hotel/Casino project." (Finding of Fact No. 28; R. 983.)
Had the meetings in Salt Lake City occurred after the Lease Agreement
was executed, Farmers' Properties would be hard-pressed to argue that the
"consultation" requirement of paragraph had not been satisfied. If the meetings would
have been effective to give Farmers' Properties notice of Edwairds & Daniels' retention
as the project architect after the Lease Agreement was signed, why would the
meetings not have been similarly effective before the document was signed. There
was no magic in the signing of the agreement. The purpose of the "consultation"
requirement-to give notice to Farmers' Properties of proposed expenditures and an
opportunity to object-would be fully satisfied regardless whether the knowledge was
gained before or after the signing of the Lease Agreement.

In its opening brief, Edwards & Daniels discussed the purpose of the
"consultation" requirement of paragraph 8. The paragraph was designed, according to
the attorney who drafted the provision, to avoid giving Soter/Knudsen a "blank check."
(Tr. [2-9-90], at 46-47, 48; see Edwards & Daniels' opening brief, at 23.)10 Fran
Archuletta,11 of Farmers' Properties, testified that he had a similar understanding. He
acknowledged that Farmers' Properties would be responsible for preliminary expenses
incurred in excess of the initial $50,000.00 if they agreed. "My understanding," he
testified, " was that there was some possibility that the $50,000 could be exceeded if
we were consulted, if we agreed." (Tr. [2-9-90], at 21; emphasis added.)
Farmers' Properties failed in its brief to recognize or address in any way
the lower court's finding that, when they signed the Lease Agreement, they had
already agreed that Edwards & Daniels be retained as project architect. (Findings of
Fact Nos. 26-28; R. 983-83.) In their brief, Farmers' Properties argues that, under
paragraph 8, they would not be liable for expenses over and above the initial

10

In their brief, the Farmers' Properties defendants seemingly take issue with Stan
Stoll's testimony regarding his drafting of paragraph 8. They argue that he "conceded
that his testimony concerning Paragraph 8 was highly colored in favor of his client."
(Farmers' Properties' Brief, at 24.) In point of fact, Mr. Stoll was asked by Farmers'
Properties' counsel at trial whether his "understanding may have been somewhat colored
to the benefit of Soter-Knudsen." He answered, "Certainly." (Tr. [2-9-90], at 49-50.)
Nowhere in their brief, however, do the Farmers' Properties defendants take issue with
Mr. Stoll's statement that Farmers' Properties' primary concern was that Soter/Knudsen
not be given a "blank check."
11

Mr. Archuleta is an attorney licensed in the State of Nevada, and represented
Farmers' Properties and the individual defendants in negotiating the Lease Agreement
with Soter/Knudsen. (Tr. [2-2-90], at 80; [2-9-90], at 14.)
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$50,000.00 unless they first agreed. They quote Archuleta's testimony that
Soter/Knudsen "were supposed to talk to us and ask us if we agreed that we should
expend this amount of money." (Farmers' Properties' Brief, at 23.) They argue that
Soter/Knudsen "could not fulfill this obligation merely be notifying and sending a copy
of an invoice or a bill after the expense had been incurred." Id. (emphasis in original).
Farmers' Properties somehow overlooks the fact that Edwards & Daniels
did not argue in its brief that the obligations of paragraph 8 were satisfied by the
conversations that Greg Soter testified he had with Verl Sorter or by Greg Sotefs
claim that he sent copies of Edwards & Daniels' invoices to Farmers' Properties.12
Edwards & Daniels' argument on appeal is simple: Farmers' Properties had in fact
agreed that Edwards & Daniels be retained as project architect, as the lower court
found in meetings held in Salt Lake City during the summer of 1984. Farmers'
Properties' agreement to retain Edwards & Daniels was valid prior to the execution of
the Lease Agreement and it continued to be valid even after the agreement was signed.
E.

The Lease Agreement was an integrated contract and
evidence of the intent of Farmers' Properties is inadmissible
to vary or contradict the terms of paragraph 8.
Instead of addressing the legal effect of their agreement in the summer

of 1984 that Edwards & Daniels be retained as the project architect, the Farmers'
Properties defendants devote most of their brief to a discussion of their intent that the

12

The trial court found against Edwards & Daniels on these points. (Findings of Fact
Nos. 7-10; R. 978-79.) Edwards & Daniels has not appealed from those findings and does
seek any review thereof.
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architects would be paid through construction financing that Soter/Knudsen was
attempting to obtain. The lower court found that the Lease Agreement was an
integrated contract and that it represented the entire contract between the parties.
(Finding of Fact No. 17; R. 981.) Defendants' intent is inadmissible to vary or
contradict the terms of the Lease Agreement under the parol evidence rule. Plateau
Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). The
lower court allowed the Farmers' Properties defendants to testify regarding their
intent, but only for the purpose of resolving the ambiguity inherent in the
"consultation" clause.
II.
ALL OF EDWARDS & DANIELS' WORK IN PREPARING PLANS AND
DESIGNS WAS NECESSARY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROJECT.
In footnote 8 of their Brief, the Farmers Properties defendants assert that
Edwards & Daniels moved 53 percent of its fee from the last design phase to the
construction phase and that M[b]ecause construction never started, at least 53 percent
of E&D's fee should never have been due." (Farmers' Properties Brief, at 33 n.8.) At
trial, Gregory Soter admitted he made the change to the contract unilaterally. (Tr. [1 31-90], at 137.)13 He testified that he wanted to avoid having to pay Edwards &
Daniels for 53 percent of its work in preparing plans and designs until the
construction phase began when financing would be available, so he moved 53 percent

13

Ralph Edwards, the principal responsible for the project on behalf of Edwards &
Daniels, testified that Sotei^s change to the contract document was unilateral and that he
did not agree to the modification. (Tr. [1-31-90, at 121-22.)
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from the construction document phase to the actual construction phase. He stated
that he wanted to pay Edwards & Daniels 53 percent of its fee from construction
draws. It was merely for the purpose of delaying payment to Edwards & Daniels for
preparation of construction documents. (Tr. [1-31-90], at 138; Tr. [2-1-90], at 8690.)
Greg Soter testified that, although he had hoped to pay Edwards &
Daniels the 53 percent from construction draws, no financing was ever obtained on
the project. That fact did not affect Soter/Knudsen's liability to Edwards & Daniels.
He testified that Edwards & Daniels was entitled to be paid, even though no
construction phase occurred. (Tr. [1-31-90], at 140.) Soter testified further that the
53 percent was due and owing to Edwards & Daniels even though the construction
financing fell through and no construction phase occurred. (Tr. [2-1-90], at 161-62.)
The trial court agreed with Edwards & Daniels' position that Edwards & Daniels was
entitled to payment in full, including the 53 percent. The court found that Edwards &
Daniels "fully performed under its Contract with Soter/Knudsen Construction
Company" (Finding of Fact No. 19; R. 981), and awarded Edwards & Daniels
judgment against Soter/Knudsen in the principal amount of $119,301.99. (R. 1006.)
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RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL
III.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT EDWARDS & DANIELS WAS A THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARY AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

Farmers' Properties misquoted the record; the trial court
did not exclude the evidence of Farmers' Properties' intent
to benefit Edwards & Daniels as a third-party beneficiary.
In their brief, Farmers' Properties complains that the court erred in

excluding evidence of the parties' intent to benefit Edwards & Daniels during the
examination of Gregory Soter. A more complete examination of the transcript,
however, reveals that the court actually overruled Edwards & Daniels' objection.
Farmers' Properties quoted only a portion of the court's ruling in their brief. (Farmers'
Properties' Brief, at 43.) After indicating that there was no genuine issue of material
fact whether the architects were intended beneficiaries under paragraph 8, u the court
went on to add that the evidence would be allowed if it related to Farmers' Properties'
fraud claim and fraud defense. After a discussion with Mr. Archuleta, the court
reversed its previous position and overruled the objection, allowing Greg Soter to
answer the question. Soter answered that he could not recall telling Archuleta that
the parties never intended to benefit the architects when they signed the contract.
(Tr. [2-1-90], at 136.)

14

This was the portion of the court's ruling that Farmers' Properties cited in their
brief. (Tr. [2-1-90], at 133-34), quoted in Farmers' Properties' Brief, at 43.)
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Although the trial court refused to consider this testimony on the issue
whether Edwards & Daniels was an intended third-party beneficiary, even had he
considered it, it would have been of no probative value whatsoever. Greg Soter gave
no evidence that would have supported a finding that the parties to the Lease
Agreement did not intend to benefit the architects.
B.

Evidence of Farmers' Properties' intent to benefit Edwards
& Daniels as a third-party beneficiary was inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule.
Edwards & Daniels does not dispute that the issue whether a third party

is intended to be a third-party beneficiary of a contract is an issue of fact, as Farmers'
Properties asserts. (Farmers' Properties Brief, at 44-45.) That principle, however,
does not require the admission of extrinsic evidence in violation of the parol evidence
rule. In the present case, the issue of fact regarding the intent of the parties could be
determined from the language of the Lease Agreement alone. The lower court
properly refused to consider evidence that would vary or contradict the unambiguous
language of paragraph 8 of the Lease Agreement. Paragraph 8 provided that Farmers'
Properties would be liable for "preliminary expenses," which were specifically defined
as including architectural fees. The court found that the Lease Agreement was an
"integrated contract and represented the entire agreement between the parties."
(Finding of Fact No. 17; R. 981.) Hence, the court's refusal to consider extrinsic
evidence could not have been erroneous.
The court impliedly granted summary judgment in favor of Edwards &
Daniels, holding that it was an intended third-party beneficiary based on the plain
088\28443.1
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language of paragraph 8 of the Lease Agreement. Although the Order on the motion
did not specifically hold that Edwards & Daniels was a third-party beneficiary
impliedly did so. The court specified that one of the issues to be tried was whether
paragraph 8 was ambiguous on the question whether the consultation requirement
"was a condition precedent to any liability on the part of Farmer' Properties, and its
guarantors, to plaintiff, as a third-party beneficiary." (R. 705-06; emphasis added.)15
Edwards & Daniels had moved for summary judgment on the ground
that it was a third-party beneficiary as a matter of law based on the language of the
Lease Agreement. Farmers' Properties did not oppose the motion on that ground, but
implicitly agreed that Edwards & Daniels was a third-party beneficiary.16 Thus, the
trial court noted that "there was nothing submitted to me at the time of the Motion
for Summary Judgment, and there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
or not there were intended beneficiaries, one of which being the plaintiff architect."
(Tr. [2-1-90], at 134.) The court needed no evidence beyond that contained in

15

A copy of the Order of January 31, 1990, is appended to Farmers' Properties Brief
as Exhibit G.
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A review of Farmers' Properties memoranda in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment (appended to Farmers' Properties' Brief as Exhibits B and D) contain
no argument whatsoever that Edwards & Daniels was an intended third-party beneficiary.
Hence, the lower court noted at trial that "there was nothing submitted to me at the time
of the Motion for Summary Judgment" on the third-party beneficiary issue. (Tr. [2-1 -90],
at 134.) Moreover, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, held on January
26, 1990, the Court signed the Pretrial Order (R. 704), which set forth the factual issues
to be tried based on representations made by defendants' counsel regarding the factual
issues to be tried. (Tr. [1-26-90].) At the hearing counsel for defendants made no
mention that there was any issue regarding whether the parties to the Lease Agreement
intended to benefit Edwards & Daniels.
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paragraph 8 in order to determine that Edwards & Daniels was an intended
beneficiary, as the court so found. (Finding of Fact No. 21; R. 981.)17
Farmers' Properties contends that the court's ruling on the summary
judgment was error since the Affidavit of Fran Archuleta raised an issue of fact
regarding the intent of the parties. Yet, Archuleta's self-serving assertion in his
affidavit that "it was never our intention or a subject of discussion to give anyone else,
in the nature of the architects, any rights under the contract" (R. 572) contradicts the
language of paragraph 8, which obligates Farmers' Properties to pay fees owed to the
architects, provided that the specified conditions were met. Although the record is
unclear, the trial court apparently refused to consider Archuleta's affidavit on the
question since it varied or contradicted the unambiguous language of paragraph 8 of
the Lease Agreement.18
Farmers' Properties asserts that the "the trial court's Finding of Fact that
E&D was a third-party beneficiary was clearly erroneous because no evidence was
taken on the issue."19 To the contrary, the trial court had ample evidence of the

17

In this Finding of Fact, the court found that "Edwards & Daniels was an intended
beneficiary of the Lease Agreement between Soter/Knudsen Construction Company and
Farmers' Properties, Inc., dated September 14,1984, pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Lease
Agreement." (R. 981-82.)
18

As noted above, Farmers' Properties did not argue in its memoranda in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment or at the hearing on the motion held January 26,
1990, that Edwards & Daniels was not a third-party beneficiary. (See Tr. [1-26-90].)
19

Farmers' Properties made no effort in their brief to marshal the evidence in favor
of the court's finding.
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parties' intent from the plain language of paragraph 8. Under the law of Utah and
Nevada20 Edwards & Daniels would be a third-party beneficiary.
C.

Edwards & Daniels' need not prove that it relied on its
status as a third-party beneficiary.
In footnote 12 of their brief, the Farmers' Properties defendants assert

that Utah and Nevada law require Mthat the third-party beneficiary rely to some extent
on its status as a third-party beneficiary." (Farmers' Properties Brief, at 44 n.12.)
This is an erroneous statement of law. Neither of the cases that they cite describes
any such rule of law. In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah
App. 1990), this Court upheld the lower court's finding that Ringwood was not an
intended beneficiary of the contract between Poggio and Gardner and Hernandez. The
lower court had found that Ringwood was an intended third-party beneficiary of two
prior contracts, which had been superseded by the contract at issue. Because
"Ringwood did not rely upon, assent to, nor file an action" based on either of those
prior contracts before they were superseded, the lower court did not err in finding that
Ringwood was not an intended beneficiary. The Ringwood case does not hold that a
third-party beneficiary must rely on its status as such in order to maintain a claim.

20

See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blonquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1386
(Utah 1989) (Court held that subcontractor was third-party beneficiary to contract
between owner and contractor, which provided that the owner would pay all
indebtedness relating to the furnishing of labor and materials); Lipshie v. Tracy
Investment Co., 566 P.2d 819, 824 (Nev. 1977) (court held that "[a] contract to pay a
debt to a third person is presumed for his benefit unless it appears that the contract was
not so intended").
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Defendants also miscite Lipshie v. Tracv Investment Co., 93 Nev. 370,
566 P.2d 819 (1977). There, the defendant Tracy Investment Company had entered
into an agreement that a debt owed to the plaintiff, Lipshie, would survive certain
bankruptcy proceedings. Tracy Investment Company did not make any promises to
assume or pay the obligation to Lipshie. Id. at 825. The court held that in order to
obtain the status of a third-party beneficiary, "there must clearly appear a promissory
intent to benefit the third-party . . . and ultimately it must be shown that third-parties'
reliance is foreseeable . . . ." Id. at 824-25 (citations omitted). The Court did not hold
that actual reliance must be shown, but only that the promise to benefit the thirdparty must be of the nature that it could be foreseen that the third-party would rely
on it. The present case is far different from the facts of Lipshie. Here, the promise
contained in Paragraph 8 of the Lease Agreement very clearly was intended to benefit
Edwards & Daniels and the promise was of such a nature that Edwards & Daniels'
would foreseeably have relied on it.
Edwards & Daniels has been able to discover no case, and defendants
cite none, that holds that a third-party beneficiary must prove actual reliance by the
promise. Other Nevada cases involving questions of third-party liability do not even
mention the reliance element discussed in Lipshie. See Morelli v. Morelli, 720 P.2d
704, 705 (Nev. 1986); Gibbs v. Giles. 607 P.2d 118, 120 (Nev. 1980); Olson v.
IacomettL 533 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Nev. 1975). Similarly, reliance is not an element
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mentioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Ron Case Roofine & Asphalt Company v.
Blonquist 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).21
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT
SOTER/KNUDSEN VIOLATED PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT.
Farmers' Properties sought to introduce evidence that paragraph 7 of the
Lease Agreement constituted a condition precedent to any liability under paragraph 8.
Paragraph 7 provided that Farmers' Properties' obligations under the agreement were
subject to and contingent on the parties securing necessary licenses and permits,
including gaming licenses required in Nevada for the operation of a casino.
The trial court excluded all evidence on this question because it had not
been raised as a defense prior to trial. Edwards & Daniels served interrogatories that
required defendants to state the factual basis for the seventh affirmative defense,
which asserted that there was a failure of a condition precedent. (Interrogatory No.
63.) In their answers to that interrogatory, the Farmers' Properties defendants did not
make any reference to paragraph 7 of the Lease Agreement. (R. 709, 751, 776, 801.)
Without notice of the defense, Edwards & Daniels was not prepared through discovery
to address the issue at trial and was prejudiced. (Tr. [2-1-90], at 7.) Because of the

21

In addition, Edwards & Daniels was not required to introduce evidence of its
reliance since that was not an issue raised at the Pretrial Conference held on January 26,
1990 (Tr. [1-26-90] nor in the Pretrial Order (R. 704.)
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failure to respond to the interrogatories, the court ruled that paragraph 7 would not
be an issue at trial. (Tr. [2-1-90], at 20.)
The Farmers' Properties defendants contend on appeal that their "attempt
to introduce evidence on Paragraph 7 was in the nature of an amendment to the
pleadings during trial." (Farmers' Properties Brief, at 48.) This is a curious position
to take. The record does not reflect that Farmers' Properties ever sought to amend
their pleadings.22 Farmers' Properties cannot raise this issue for the first time on
appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine Dev. v. Frontier Invs.,
799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990).
Finally, Farmers' Properties claims that questions and answers given
during the deposition of Verl Sorter was sufficient to put Edwards & Daniels on notice
of the existence of the defense. The court properly rejected this argument. The few
questions asked in the deposition regarding gaming licenses were hardly sufficient to
put Edwards & Daniels on notice that paragraph 7 was a condition precedent to
liability under paragraph 8. (Tr. [2-7-90], at 130.)
CONCLUSION
The lower court found that Farmers' Properties agreed that Edwards &
Daniels be retained as project architect. Edwards & Daniels performed its contract
with the knowledge and participation of Farmers' Properties. Under paragraph 8 of

22

It seems unclear why, exactly, Farmers' Properties would want to amend their
pleadings, since they had pled the affirmative defense of failure of a condition precedent.
The issue at the trial was not whether it had been pled, but whether defendants had
properly answered interrogatories addressed to the affirmative defense.
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the Lease Agreement, Farmers' Properties is liable to Edwards & Daniels for its unpaid
fees. Edwards & Daniels urges this Court to reverse the lower court and direct the
entry of judgment against the Farmers' Properties defendants.
DATED this

day of March, 1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By:

R. Stepieri) Marshall
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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